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DOUGLAS M. BRANSON*
This Article examines an issue that many corporations, trusts, notfor-profit corporations, and other entities should consider:
whether the choice of legal form matters? Is it significant, for
example, that a corporation organizes as a corporation as
opposed to a trust, or vice versa? Ultimately, the Article
concludes that entity choice in fact is not as important as one may
previously have thought. In reaching that conclusion, this Article
examines converging corporate and trust laws in addition to
governing standards, and takes an in depth look at Alaska Native
Corporations and Hawaii’s Bishop Estate, both of which help
illustrate the non-traditional corporate and trust functions
performed by such entities. From these examinations, it is clear
that governance is governance regardless of the choice of legal
form, a valuable lesson for every legal entity today.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern era, many entities exist that no longer fit neatly
into the existing legal categories, such as partnership, corporation,
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limited liability company, limited partnership, not-for-profit
corporation, mutual-benefit corporation, trust, charitable trust, or
charity. Many entities exhibit attributes of three, four, or even five
1
types of legal entities; they are indeterminate. The question this
Article asks is if the choice of legal entity makes any difference or
2
as big of a difference as it did more than thirty years ago, and,
accordingly, how directors and senior executives of such entities
should conduct themselves. Does it remain a useful endeavor to
shoehorn them into this or that legal category? What legal
consequences flow from the choice? Have those consequences
lessened over time? Does entity choice matter any more, as many
people feel it does, and if so, for how much?
These questions are examined below in two contexts that have
traditionally had very different laws and governance standards: the
corporation and the charitable trust. This examination reveals that:
the differences in the law and governance practices in corporations
and charitable trusts have blurred over time. And, as the law and
governance practices have converged, the choice of legal form has
become less important.
To illustrate that entity choice is not as important as it once
was, this Article looks at two unique entities: the Alaska Native
Corporation and the Bishop Estate (a charitable trust). In 1971,
Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
3
(ANCSA). ANCSA bestowed upon Alaska Natives forty-four
million acres of land and $1 billion. Rather than to Natives
themselves, ANCSA bestowed the land and money on 13 regional
and 203 village corporations, all of which obtained certificates as
4
business corporations under Alaska law. Despite certificates as
1. The greatest proliferation of new entities and new types of entity has been
in the area of limited liability companies (LLCs), attributed principally to the
flexibility LLC forms are thought to bestow on owners. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein,
Unlimited Limited Liability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407 (1999). Comparatively, the
vastly increased amount of flexibility that modern corporation laws now contain
has received little attention. An exception is Dennis S. Karjala, A Second Look at
Special Close Corporation Legislation, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1980) (arguing that
there is no need for special legislation because mainline statutes have become
sufficiently flexible).
2. The author explored the question of what state corporate laws should
require of Native corporations in 1979. See Douglas M. Branson, Square Pegs in
Round Holes: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Corporations Under Corporate
Law, 8 UCLA ALASKA L. REV. 103, 125–31 (1979).
3. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–28 (2000).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 196–98
(1978). Two-hundred and three village corporations were eligible to receive land
and money, and all were originally chartered as business (“profit”) corporations
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business corporations, however, ANCSA corporations shift from
role to role. They act as political entities, business corporations,
not-for-profit corporations, and social service agencies, sometimes
5
doing so over time while at other times simultaneously. Observers
urge that, despite being corporations in law, ANCSA corporations
6
take on these various colorations at various times.
A similar situation is found in Hawaii in the form of the
Bishop Estate, which is a charitable trust. Beatrice Pauahi Bishop
(1831–1884), a member of the Hawaiian royal family, left her
landownings, the largest in Hawaii, in trust “to erect and maintain
in the Hawaiian Islands two schools . . . called the Kamehameha
7
Schools.” The schools were to give “preference to Hawaiians of
8
pure or part aboriginal blood.” The trust became the “wealthiest
9
charity in the United States,” with assets well over $10 billion,
making it third among United States foundations and greater in
10
size than all but five of 746 university endowments. Yet the five
under Alaska law. Id. Most Alaska Natives who enrolled in the 1970s did so in a
regional and in a village corporation, but not all. Several thousand Alaska
Natives, known as “at large” shareholders, hold shares in a regional but not in a
village or urban corporation. See, e.g, Oliver v. Sealaska Corp., 192 F.3d 1220 (9th
Cir. 1999) (claim by at large shareholders).
5. See Branson, supra note 2, at 125–31.
6. See, e.g., Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Alaska 1997)
(upholding argument that discriminatory payments amount to a “social welfare
program” under ANCSA); see also David Case, Listen to the Canary: A Reply to
Professor Branson, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 209, 218–19 (1987) (analogies to tribal
governments and tribes).
7. SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. ROTH, BROKEN TRUST 301 app. (2006).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 51.
10. The largest ten foundations are: 1. Bill and Melinda Gates - $29.1 billion;
2. Ford - $11.6 billion; 3. Robert Wood Johnson - $9.1 billion; 4. The Lily
Endowment - $8.4 billion; 5. W.W. Kellogg - $7.3 billion; 6. William and Flora
Hewlett - $7.1 billion; 7. David and Lucille Packard - $5.8 billion; 8. Andrew W.
Mellon - $5.5 billion; 9. John and Catherine MacArthur - $5.4 billion; and
10. Gordon and Betty Moore - $5.2 billion. Noelle Barton, Caroline Preston &
Ian Wilhelm, Slow Growth at the Biggest Foundations, CHRONICLE OF
PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 23, 2006, at 6, 7. The largest university endowments are:
1. Harvard University - $25.5 billion; 2. Yale University - $15.2 billion; 3. Stanford
University - $12.2 billion; 4. University of Texas System - $11.6 billion;
5. Princeton University - $11.2 billion; 6. Massachusetts Institute of Technology $6.7 billion; 7. University of California System - $5.2 billion; 8. Columbia
University - $5.2 billion; 9. Texas A&M University - $5.0 billion; and 10. Michigan
University System - $4.9 billion. Erin Strout, College Endowments Post
‘Respectable’ Returns for 2005. THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Jan. 27,
2005, at App. 1.
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trustees ran the Bishop trust as a small charity, at times as if it was
a partnership and at other times as if it was an adjunct to a political
party.
Parts II and III provide an overview of the evolution of
corporate law and corporate governance over the last thirty or so
years. Many changes in corporate law and corporate governance
practice have occurred in this time, and an understanding of each is
the starting point for any discussion about the importance of
corporate form.
Part IV examines the question of whether entity choice
matters in the context of Alaska Native Corporations. Through an
examination of the hybrid roles that Native corporations play, this
Article concludes that form is not as important as it was thirty
years ago. Although technically corporations, Alaska Native
Corporations perform many non-traditional corporate functions,
functions that typically have been assumed by nonprofit
corporations, trusts, political entities, and social service agencies.
Although by serving these roles, Native corporations may provide
valuable, necessary services, Part IV concludes by suggesting that
hybridization has some serious consequences for corporate law and
corporate governance.
Part V then shifts to an examination of the law and
governance practices of charitable trusts. Although differences
remain between trust and corporate law, Part V identifies the areas
where trust law has converged with corporate law. Part VI
concludes with an examination of the Bishop Estate. Although the
Bishop Estate was organized as a trust, it served many non-trust
functions. Thus, just as with Alaska Native Corporations, the
choice of entity was less relevant.
Unlike Alaska Native
Corporations, however, mismanagement of the Bishop Estate led
to a number of tragic consequences. Alaska Native Corporations
should heed this tale of mismanagement, because in an
environment where form matters less, proper governance—not just
proper trust governance or proper corporate governance—matters
more.
II. EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE LAW
A. Change in the Board of Directors’ Mission
Historically, the dominant legal entity form for business
enterprises has been the corporation, but corporate law has not
stood still. Older corporate statutes required boards of directors to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation.
That
imperative, however, has given way to a softer phrasing:
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“corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of,
and the business and affairs managed by or under the direction of,
11
[the] board of directors.” The reality is that modern directors do
not manage, at least in corporations of size. Instead, they oversee
the management and perhaps provide strategic direction to the
corporation. The American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate
Governance and Structure attempts to align legal requirements with
reality by providing that “[t]he management of the business of a
publicly held corporation should be conducted by or under the
supervision of such senior executive officers as are designated by
12
the board of directors.” Therefore, the highest calling of a board
of directors becomes to select, monitor, and, if necessary, replace
the senior executive officers of the corporation, most particularly
13
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

11. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984). See also ALASKA STAT.
§ 10.06.450(a) (2006).
12. 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 (1994).
13. See, e.g., id. § 3.02(a)(1). Boards of directors are to “[s]elect, regularly
evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, where appropriate, replace the principal
senior executives.” Id. In corporate settings, the shareholders monitor the
directors who, as a board, monitor the senior executives. There are watchers
watching the watchers, so to speak. Post-Enron and post-WorldCom, many
politicians, regulators, and other onlookers have abandoned the model,
attempting to put directors (most of whom are part-time) back in the business of
managing. In the last several years, for example, the Model Business Corporation
Act section 8.01 has been amended by the addition of a new subsection (c). This
subsection states:
In the case of a public company, the board’s oversight responsibilities
include attention to:
(i) business performance and plans;
(ii) major risks to which the corporation may be exposed;
(iii) the performance and compensation of senior officers;
(iv) policies and practices to foster the corporation’s compliance with law
and ethical conduct;
(v) preparation of the corporation’s financial statements;
(vi) the effectiveness of the corporation’s internal controls;
(vii) arrangements for providing adequate and timely information to
directors; and
(viii) the composition of the board and its committees, taking into
account the important role of independent directors.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(c) (2005). See also Douglas M. Branson, Too
Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate Governance in the Post-Enron, PostWorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV. 65, 109–11 (2006).
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B. Enhanced Committee Structures
Today, company boards organize through a committee
structure. Modern corporate laws facilitate board supervision and
oversight by authorizing the creation of a wide array of board
14
The principal committees are the audit, the
committees.
15
nominating, and compensation committees. Individual boards of
directors may also have one or more legacy committees, such as
16
finance, capital improvements, social responsibility, and so on.
The newest committees to appear have been the risk management
committee, which oversees implementation by management of a
reporting and early warning system to ward off criminal or
regulatory contretemps, and the disclosure committee, which often
functions as a subcommittee of the board’s audit committee.
C. Board Composition: Legal Requirements
There are no particular legal requirements for being a
director. Older formulations required directors to exercise “care
and skill.” Modern commentators, however, deny that any skill

14. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25(a) (2005) (“Unless this Act, the articles of
incorporation or the bylaws provide otherwise, a board of directors may create
one or more committees and appoint one or more members of the board of
directors to serve on any such committee.”). This section further provides that
“each committee may exercise the powers of the board of directors.” Id.
§ 8.25(d); see also ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.468 (2006).
15. See, e.g., 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3A.02–.05, at 114–33 (1994); DOUGLAS M.
BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 5.04–.07, at 234–43 (1993).
16. In the 1960s, corporations often had but a single committee, styled as the
executive committee, which had the power of the full board, save for items
enumerated in corporate law. Today’s Model Business Corporation Act
empowers directors to create “one or more committees.” There is no mention of
an executive committee. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25(a) (2005). Cf. ALASKA
STAT. § 10.06.468 (2006) (“[A board of directors] “may designate from among its
members an executive committee and other committees of the board.”). The
executive committee exercised the board’s power between meetings of the full
board. Usually the CEO, another senior executive, such as the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO), and the heads of principal subsidiaries or divisions made up the
executive committee. Today, executive committees are seen infrequently for the
reason that they permit an inner circle, usually dominated by insiders, to hijack
governance of the corporation. The remaining board members, more than ever,
become the “parsley on the fish.” Even if the remaining directors wish to play a
greater role in governance, costs will hinder collective action by them sufficient to
overcome actions of a powerful executive committee. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M.
BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE 135 (2007).
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ever was a prerequisite for the position.17
These latter
commentators in fact won out in the drafting of the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA), which provides that directors “shall
discharge their duties with the care that a person in like position
18
would reasonably believe appropriate under the circumstances.”
Once she becomes a director, however, a person must come up to
the speed necessary to perform a director’s responsibilities in that
19
corporation.
D. Specialist Directors
There is no such thing as an honorary, ceremonial, advisory, or
20
specialized director. Each director must bring to bear her abilities
across the full spectrum of matters that come to the board. In the
past, one would occasionally come across specialized directors,
denominated as such, for example a director charged with
oversight over a particular geographical region or state. Today,
however, the practice is to place specialists, either by expertise or
geography, such as the technical wizards in a software company, on
21
advisory boards.
Nominating committees, often known as governance
committees, choose directors based upon strengths the candidates
possess and the board feels it needs. A current vogue, for example,
is to select one or two directors with international experience.
Furthermore, the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) requires
that at least one member of the board’s audit committee be a

17. Orbel Sebring, Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the
Model Business Corporation Act, 30 BUS. LAW. 501, 505 (1975) (“While the cases
are replete with discussions of the need for directors to use . . . skill . . . [,]there is a
paucity of authority as to what ‘skill’ and ‘diligence,’ as distinguished from ‘care,’
are properly to be expected from a corporate director. . . . In point of fact, skill, in
the sense of technical competence in a particular field, has never been regarded as
a qualification for the office of director. . . . Accordingly, the words ‘diligence’
and ‘skill’ were omitted from the standard adopted.”).
18. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2005). Alaska’s standard of conduct
for directors is more objective than the most recent Model Act iterations, and
makes express a duty of inquiry: “with the care, including reasonable inquiry, that
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances.” ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (2006). It does not import skill into
the equation and, in that respect, is consonant with the Model Act.
19. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821–22 (N.J. 1981)
(spouse became director after husband’s death); BRANSON, supra note 15, § 6.05,
at 264.
20. See generally BRANSON, supra note 15, § 6.17, at 279.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
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director who is a “financial expert,” defined by the Securities and
Exchange Commission as one with hands on experience in auditing
22
public corporations. Boards may search for individual members
of stature as well as for those with certain technical expertise, such
as in engineering, finance, or computing. Those are strengths, not
specialties. It is important to note that a corporate director must
still bring to bear the requisite amount of care and loyalty to each
matter that comes to the full board’s attention, just as co-trustees
23
must.
E. Duty of Loyalty
A corporate director’s duty is in every instance to serve the
best interests of the corporation rather than the best interests of
one’s self, family members, friends, associates, or other businesses
24
in which the director may have an interest. Shareholder plaintiffs
and their lawyers often perceive conflicts of interest as major
violations of this fiduciary duty, sins that violate a moral code
governing behavior as well as the law. They are not. The aim for
which the law strives, and after the fact may award damages for
breach, is compliance with the duty of loyalty (the duty to serve the
best interests of the entity). That being said, a conflict of interest is
a warning sign to which the fiduciary and her lawyer must pay
special attention, because, in the least, the appearance of a duty of
loyalty violation may be imminent. Added procedural steps may
need to be taken at this stage. “[C]onflicts of interest in the
modern charity world [, for example,] are a problem to be managed
25
rather than a disease to be eradicated.”
For example, if an organization proposes to hire the child of a
director for the role of marketing director, both the director and
the organization can manage the affair as an interested director
transaction. In doing so, the interested director can make full
disclosure, recuse herself (although statutes do not require that she
do so), and have the transaction approved by a disinterested
decision maker (usually the other directors but sometimes the
22. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265(b) (Supp. III 2003).
23. For example, delegation to a committee of the board relieves neither the
full board nor committee members from their legal responsibilities. See MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.25(f) (2005) (“The creation of, delegation of authority to, or
action by a committee does not alone constitute compliance by a director with
standards of conduct . . . .”); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.468(d) (2006) (providing for
the same).
24. Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1880); BRANSON, supra
note 15, § 8.02, at 394–96.
25. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, at xxxvi (2006).
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shareholders).26 Laws of every jurisdiction contain safe harbor
provisions sanitizing an interested director transaction that the
27
director and corporation manage in that way. There are of course
other options a director or senior executive of a business entity
28
may choose to manage conflicts of interest.
F. Approval of Trustee and Director Compensation
Corporate directors, of course, have a conflict of interest in
setting their own compensation qua directors. Statutes, however,
29
obviate the conflict. Therefore, managing of the traditional sort
becomes unnecessary.
That statutory background does not end the matter. One of
the teachings of Enron is that excessive director compensation can
taint an otherwise capable board of directors. Enron paid its
directors $350,000 per year, roughly half in stock and half in cash.
Additionally, the corporation paid from $70,000 to $500,000 in
charitable gifts or consulting fees to entities with which the
30
fourteen so-called “independent” directors were affiliated.
Directors in a corporation or trustees in a large charity are
supposed to watch the watchers, or watch the doers/watchers, the
26. See, e.g., 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.02(a) (1994) (authorization or ratification
by disinterested directors).
27. See id. at 235–36, 238–40 (describing safe harbor statutes of fifty-two
jurisdictions and including a table of disclosure provisions for various safe harbor
statutes). In Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987), the Supreme Court of
Delaware made clear that such statutes are non-exclusive and a director or
controlling shareholder, when challenged, could escape liability based upon the
fairness of the transaction, even though the fiduciary had not complied with the
statute.
28. For example, directors faced with an apparent conflict of interest can
choose to do nothing. If the child in the example above is eminently qualified for
the position, no damage or potential for damage exists as it might when the child
has meager qualifications. In the former case, the duty of loyalty is not violated.
A third way to manage the transaction would be for the interested party to resign
from the board of directors. Finally, the choice not to do the transaction at all
could be adopted.
29. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.11 (2005) (“Unless the articles of
incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, the board of directors may fix the
compensation of directors.”).
30. PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS IN ENRON’S COLLAPSE, S. REP. NO. 107-70, at 54–57 (2002); Douglas
M. Branson, Enron – When All Systems Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to
Corporate Governance Reform, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989, 1019–20 (2003).
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senior executives. One of a director’s highest callings is to
reprimand or remove senior executives, mainly the CEO, if in the
board’s judgment that is necessary. Overly compensated directors
will have less of an incentive to rock the boat if down the road they
could lose their directorship and the emoluments of office that go
with it. There does not exist any conflict of interest or duty of
loyalty violation one can put their finger on; instead, experience
teaches that excessive compensation for directors corrupts the
31
system, presenting a moral hazard for the individual director.
G. Level of Compensation
What level of compensation is excessive? In Marx v. Akers,
the New York Court of Appeals declined to find as a matter of law
32
Richard
that $75,000 in annual compensation was excessive.
Breeden, as corporate monitor, required that emerging from
bankruptcy as MCI, Inc., WorldCom pay its directors no less than
33
Conference Board of the United States
$150,000 annually.
statistics show that fees directors in large, publicly held
corporations receive are well below the $350,000 received at
Enron. Average director compensation for directors in 2002 was:
(1) $59,000 in the diversified financial services industries,
(2) $55,500 at petroleum companies, (3) $54,500 in the
telecommunications industry, (4) $48,500 in the gas and electric
34
industry, and (5) $48,000 in the industrial chemicals industry.
31. Corporate governance expert Charles Elson has opined that it is per se
wrongful for directors to receive any compensation from the corporation other
than a director’s fees. Branson, supra note 30, at 1020 (“[Directors] should have
‘no financial connection to the company whatsoever’. . . . If a director’s role is as a
consultant, hire him as a consultant. If a director’s role is to be as a director, hire
him as a director. You cannot blend the two.”).
32. 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1042–43 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that the compensation
package included $55,000 cash and 100 shares of IBM common stock). IBM later
raised the annual retainer to $100,000, along with modest stock option grants.
Early in 2007, IBM announced a $200,000 annual flat fee compensation scheme,
citing the potential corrupting influence of stock grants, which it eliminated
altogether. Joann S. Lublin & William M. Bulkeley, IBM Ends Director Stock
Options, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2006, at A1.
33. RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO HON. JED S.
RAKOFF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK § 3.01, at 78 (2004).
34. CHARLES PECK, HENRY M. SILVERT & GINA MCCORMICK, THE
CONFERENCE BOARD, DIRECTOR COMPENSATION, AND BOARD PRACTICES IN
2002, at 6. The amount directors receive in restricted stock grants and options
tends to be small but increases total compensation and changes the categories, as
follows: (1) oil and gas services, $96,028; (2) chemicals, $76,805; (3) diversified
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Pre-SOX, a California court held that receipt of $235,000 in
fees by a firm did not cause a partner of that firm to lose his status
35
as an independent director of Chevron, Inc. Post-Enron and postSOX, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) regulations fix the
level of compensation a consultant or her firm may receive without
36
having to be classified as non-independent at $100,000 per year.
Of course, loss of independence does not equate to banishment.
Instead, loss of independent status simply means that: (1) a
director’s vote may no longer be the swing vote on board tallies;
(2) she may no longer serve on the audit committee; and (3) she
may not count in the director counting exercise, which leads to the
determination that a clear majority of independent directors
approved the transaction and that the transaction is entitled to
37
Rather than
“enhanced” business judgment rule protection.
banishment, therefore, possession of these deficits often may, but
not necessarily will, result in loss of the person’s position as a
director.
III. EVOLUTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Background
Corporate governance is not law, although many law schools
offer the subject.
Rather, among other things, corporate
governance is a meld of mandatory legal requirements, enabling
legal provisions, and business and management science tools and
devices. For the most part, corporate governance is soft law—
advisory and aspirational, a larger concentric circle around laws,
such as corporate statutes and cases—or quasi-laws—such as
NASDAQ or stock exchange rules, which contain mandatory
content and form smaller circles within the larger circle of

financial services, $76,750; (4) food, beverage, and tobacco, $72,894; and
(5) plastics and rubber manufacture, $71,200. Id. at 8.
35. Katz v. Chevron, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 689–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
36. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 3.03A.02(b)(ii) (2004), available at
http://www.nccg.ru/en/site.xp/057053049124.html. The NASDAQ governance
regulations decree loss of independence any time a director or her firm receive
$60,000 or more annually from the corporation on whose board she sits.
NASDAQ CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES CHANGES (2003), available at
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorpGovSummary.pdf.
37. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del.
1987) (“[W]ith the independent directors in the majority, proof that the board
acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation is materially enhanced.”).
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“corporate governance.”38
Precepts of modern corporate
governance speak to the following: board size, elimination of
trophy directors, board and boardroom decorum, director training,
director performance reviews, and standards of the corporation.
B. Board Size
Wise corporate governance practice holds that a board of
directors should neither be too large given the size of the
corporation (thirteen or fifteen, potentially even seven or nine for a
smaller corporation), nor too small (just one or three, or even five
for a larger entity). The average board size of NYSE listed
39
corporations was 9.2 persons in 2003. The number of directors
ranged from three to thirty-one. Average board sizes in the S&P
40
500, the 500 largest corporations by revenue, was 10.9 directors.
The mode among the Fortune 200 was eleven in 2000, twelve in
2001, and eleven again in 2002. The trend is toward smaller boards,
41
often having only seven or nine directors.
C. Elimination of Trophy Directors
Many corporations eschew hiring or retaining directors who
serve on several other boards of directors. Similarly, many publicly
held companies forbid their CEOs to sit on any other boards of
42
directors, or limit the CEO to a single board. Directors who sit on
43
four or more boards of directors become trophy directors.

38. See, e.g., JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE at 4 (2d ed. 2005); see
also Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The
Importance of Soft Law and International Institutions, 34 GA. L. REV. 669 (2000).
39. Board Basics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R7 (table).
40. Id.
41. See BRANSON, supra note 16, at 144–45 (2007).
42. See Anita Raghavan, More CEOs Say ‘No Thanks’ to Board Seats, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 28, 2005, at B1.
43. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 16, at 155; see also Judith Dobrzynski,
When Directors Play Musical Chairs, N.Y. TIMES MONEY & BUSINESS, Nov. 17,
1996, at 1 (reporting of a director who held eighteen board seats in the 1950s). A
number of trophy directors still exist. Shirley Jackson, for example, the president
of Renesselaer Polytechnic Institute sits on seven boards of directors, including
Marathon Oil, US Steel, AT&T, Federal Express, Public Service Enterprise, and
Medtronic. Susan Bayh, the wife of Indiana Senator Evan Bayh, sits on eight
boards of directors, including Wellpoint Health Networks, Anthem Insurance,
Dandereon, Novavax, Curis, Ennis Communications, and Golden State Foods.
BRANSON, supra note 16, at 97–99.
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Corporate governance eyes trophy directors warily or simply does
not countenance them at all.44
D. Board and Boardroom Decorum
Boards generally observe high standards of decorum.
Individual directors phrase criticisms in the form of
recommendations, advice, or suggestions. Because the directors
have fully vetted most matters before they come to a vote, many
votes are recorded in board minutes as having been unanimous.
Matters as to which substantial disagreement exists simply do not
45
make it to the voting stage.
There is nothing unusual about this. Board members serve a
number of years together in a small circle of individuals. They
cannot engage in the confrontational or even combative style found
in legislature or faculty meetings. Instead, a directors’ job is to
walk softly and to carry a big stick (removal of the CEO) and
46
possibly to aid in giving strategic direction to the corporation.
E. Director Training
Pre-SOX, training for directors was rare, consisting at most of
a lecture or two by corporate counsel on fiduciary duties, in the
abstract. Post-SOX, a number of law and business schools now
offer week long courses for directors, which often have financial
content, making directors conversant with weighed average cost of
capital (WACC), return on capital employed (ROCE), or earnings
before depreciation, interest, taxes and amortization (EBDITA).

44. Another subspecies of director governance that experts eye warily is the
celebrity director. CEOs at American Express (James Robinson), Hollinger
International (Conrad Black), Morrison Knudsen (William Agee), and Walt
Disney Company (Michael Eisner), among others, stand accused of having used
celebrity directors to delay their own comeuppance. For a discussion of the issue
in the case of CEO Michael Eisner of the Walt Disney Company, see JAMES B.
STEWART, DISNEY WAR 214, 279–80 (2005).
45. See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR THE CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE
IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 84–85 (2002) (“The sense of
internal cohesion on a corporate board . . . is reinforced . . . by the existence of
group norms. . . . There is a strong emphasis on politeness and courtesy, and an
avoidance of direct conflict and confrontation.”).
46. At the Bishop Estate, trustee meetings were the opposite; they had the
“shoot to kill” debating society flavor. See KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 88, 148–
49 (“[Trustee] Jervis threw a rolled-up copy of the Sunday Advertiser at [minority
trustee Oz] Stender. Then Peters berated Stender, calling him a traitor. Peters
looked like he was going to hit Stender, but then Jervis stepped between them,
cursing Stender and shouting.”).
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Restoring Trust, written by Richard Breeden while corporate
monitor at WorldCom (later MCI, Inc.), requires both initial and
refresher training for rank and file directors as well as for audit
47
committee members.
F. Director Performance Reviews
Had Enron required a 360-degree review of its corporate
officers, Andrew Fastow, the wrongdoing Chief Financial Officer,
48
never would have gotten far in his fraud. In such a review, peers,
superiors, and subordinates all conduct performance reviews,
including reviews of director performance. Good governance
advocates call for such reviews in, for example, the governance
49
committee’s charter. A committee charter could also spell out the
consequences if a director failed to receive a sufficient mark in, for
50
example, three successive reviews.
G. Standards of the Corporation
A corporate board may be able to relieve the burden of
managing numerous and repetitive conflicts of interest and thus
potentially avoid duty-of-loyalty violations. In cases in which the
problem likely will repeat itself, the full board may delegate the
management to a mid-level corporate executive likely to have no
interest in the matter. In that way, the full board need not
entertain every request to use additional space on the corporate
aircraft, or to reserve off-season space in the corporate hunting or
golf lodge. The ALI Corporate Governance Project enshrines such
51
a delegation as a “standard of the corporation.” Ultimately, it
adds another neutral decision-maker that directors or boards may
utilize in conflict-of-interest transactions, at least those that are not
major transactions.

47. See BREEDEN, supra note 33, at 54–55 (suggesting initial and annual
refresher training for all directors); id. at 107 (suggesting additional annual
training for directors on the audit committee).
48. See Branson, supra note 30, at 1018.
49. See, e.g., Francie Dalton, All-Around Feedback: Harness the Power of 360Degree Mechanisms, 24 LEGAL MGMT. 14 (2005); Robert J. Derocher, 360 Degree
Evaluations: A Case Study from the D.C. Bar, 27 BAR LEADER 23 (2002).
50. The Bishop Estate provides an example of a charter that does not provide
for adequate performance reviews. See infra Part VI and accompanying text; see
also KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 101 (“[T]here were no job descriptions,
performance standards, or annual reviews . . . .”).
51. 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.36 (1994).
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IV. CORPORATE LAW,
GOVERNANCE, AND ANCSA CORPORATIONS
As a matter of form, Alaska Native Corporations are
technically corporations. However, they perform many noncorporate functions. Part A below discusses the various shapes
that Native corporations take. Part B discusses a few of the
consequences relating to corporate governance associated with the
hybrid nature of Native corporations.
A. ANC Non-Corporate Functions
1. Delivery of Social Services. Many corporations provide
college and university scholarships for youths, who must be Alaska
Natives and must be descendants of shareholders or shareholders
themselves. Village corporations fund health clinics in their
respective villages. They also operate food banks whose bounty
goes exclusively to Alaska Natives.
Although these activities are laudable, they are often aimed
only at Alaska Natives, in such a way that shareholder and creditor
concerns may be overlooked. Native corporations, for example,
have attempted to put corporations’ lands beyond creditors’ and
disgruntled shareholders’ reach. In Jimerson v. Tetlin Native
52
Corporation, the corporation conveyed 643,174 of 743,174 acres of
land that the corporation owned to the not-for-profit Tetlin Tribal
53
Council. In Skaflestad v. Huna Totem Corp., another village
corporation placed $35 million received from the IRS into a
settlement trust. Viewed through a cynical lens, conveyances to
settlement trusts and tribal councils re-slice the ANCSA pie.
While ANCSA provisions shield conveyances to trusts from
judicial scrutiny, arguably settlement trusts were intended to insure
protection of historic cultural sites, not wholesale conveyances to
put cash, land, and other assets beyond both creditors’ and
54
shareholders’ control. By using the ANCSA provisions in this
way, the potential to benefit from the 1971 settlement is
compromised for a significant group of Alaska Natives, not only
including those who have moved away and receive no benefit or
enjoyment from land held in trust, but also including those
shareholders who stayed but disagree with creating land reserves or
putting aside extra cash to benefit elders.

52. 144 P.2d 470, 471 (Alaska 2006).
53. 76 P.3d 391, 392–93 (Alaska 2003).
54. See 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(1) (2000).
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To this end, if village corporations wish to have increased
ability to dispense largess as they see fit, they should convert to
not-for-profit status. This author has long held that village
55
corporations should give consideration to doing so.
2. Provision of Elder Benefits. Alaska Natives have always
accorded special status to their elders. Several regional and village
corporations have sought to add flesh to the commitment. They
have set aside substantial resources to provide elder benefits,
56
above distributions to all shareholders. Under ANSCA, these
corporations make distributions (elder benefits) not with respect to
shares but with respect to shareholders (over sixty-five years of
57
age). This practice is arguably contrary to traditional corporate
58
law principles.
However, ANCSA provides, if not for the payments
themselves, then at a minimum a means for making them. The Act
authorizes Native corporations to amend their articles of
incorporation to provide for “Natives who have obtained the age of
59
sixty-five.” The corporation may make additional payment to
elders once a corporation has formally proposed a resolution,
allowed whatever debate to ensue, obtained a shareholder vote,
and filed articles of amendment with the Alaska Secretary of State
authorizing an additional class of shares, and distributed newly
authorized shares to elders. Although they are still distributions
under corporate law, payments are made with respect to shares
60
(elder-preference shares), not with respect to shareholders.
ANCSA corporations creating a class of elder preference stock
61
thus adhere to the existing rule set as modified by ANCSA.
55. See Branson, supra note 2, at 134–36.
56. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bluemink, Lawsuit Hits CIRI Bonus for Seniors,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 17, 2007, at B-1 (explaining that suits have been
filed in opposition to providing added financial benefits to original elders in
Sealaska, Cook Inlet, and Goldbelt Native corporations).
57. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (2000).
58. See 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5352 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003).
59. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (2000).
60. See, e.g., Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc., 25 P.3d 697, 701–02 (Alaska 2001)
(creating class of elder preference stock but limiting distribution to “original
shareholders” while also authorizing distribution regardless of whether an Alaska
Native still owned any shares of stock in the corporation).
61. Which would, of course, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, trump any inconsistent state laws. See U.S. CONST., art. VI
(“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land. . . .”).
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However that may be, ANCSA corporations have chosen less
arduous routes than amendment of the articles of incorporation.
Boards of directors have instead allocated corporate funds to
62
settlement trusts, also provided for by ANCSA, but, again,
arguably intended to put certain Native historical sites and similar
lands, not expanses of land or shareholder funds, out of creditors’
63
or shareholders’ reach.
Dissident shareholders have mounted a number of challenges
to the provision of elder benefits. They have lost them all. Courts
have held that settlement trust provisions preempt the state law
64
rule of equal treatment. Courts have turned back arguments that
limitation of a benefit to original shareholders amounts to violating
state law provisions outlawing record dates set more than sixty
65
days in advance.
In turning back these challenges, courts may be saying several
things. One possibility is that the end, the provision of elder
benefits, justifies the means. Second, the choice of entity does not
matter.
ANCSA corporations are not like other business
corporations, as the ANCSA makes clear. The normal corporate
law rules, or some of them, do not apply. Finally, judges may be
acting out of political expediency.
3. Dispensation of “Political” Patronage. Wisely, Native
corporations react to the environment that surrounds them. They
have branched out into a number of different industries, such as
66
provision of security services and homeland-security support.
62. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(a) (2000).
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(1).
64. See, e.g., Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 426–27 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that ANCSA preempts conflicting state laws). The author served as cocounsel for plaintiffs in the case. See also Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc., 25 P.3d 697, 702
(Alaska 2001). “Native corporations must have broad discretion to fashion elder
benefit programs that meet the needs of elders,” overriding any objections based
upon otherwise applicable state law. Id.
65. See, e.g., Sierra, 25 P.3d at 701–02; ALASKA STAT. 10.06.408(b) (2006)
(corporations may set record date no more than sixty days in advance). Goldbelt
provided for the issuance of elder-preference stock but simultaneously provided
that the corporation would immediately repurchase the shares. Sierra, 25 P.3d at
700. Plaintiffs complained that the benefit was both underinclusive and
overinclusive: the corporation provided the benefit only for elders who had been
original shareholders but bestowed the benefit on all such elders, whether they
continued to own common stock or not. Id. at 701.
66. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Scott Higham, Alaska Native
Corporations Cash in on Contracting Edge, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 25, 2004, at
A-1. There are now over 200 ANCSA corporations and subsidiaries thereof that
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Critics opine that Native corporations have branched into too
many of them.67
In Alaska itself, political exigencies may influence the business
decisions of some Native village corporations. The structure of
Native corporations makes this possible and maybe even desirable.
Because the shares in ANCSA corporations have been inalienable,
each Alaska Native tends to hold the same number of shares. In
such a case, in which most holders have 100 shares and a restriction
exists on transfer, corporate finance experts have predicted that the
entities will function as political organizations (one person, one
vote; rather than one share, one vote, as in a business corporation).
Groups of shareholders, for example, those who stayed behind in
the Native village, will lobby for and receive benefits from the
68
corporation.
The extent to which political exigencies influence business
decisions is not always clear, but in several situations they are at
least one potential explanation for a decision made by a Native
corporation. Boards and management, at times, have formed
various divisions and subsidiaries to create more jobs. For
example, one smaller regional corporation paid $27.8 million to
shareholders in 2006 in their capacities as employees and apart
69
from any dividends or distributions. This has had the likely effect
of garnering more votes and political support for certain Native
corporations’ board of director incumbents. An additional, more
negative effect of these actions has been to overextend Native
corporations and their management.

operate as “disadvantaged small businesses.” Id. They are exempt from even the
$3 million ($5 million in construction) cap on no-bid contracts that are in place for
other minority small businesses. See id.
67. See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow & Scott Higham, Some Post 9-11 Awards
Given Without Bids to Native Alaskans [sic], WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at
A-4 (arguing that Native corporations receive inordinate amount of no-bid
homeland security contracts that may not be beneficial to the general public).
68. See Jonathan Karpoff & Edward M. Rice, Organizational Form, Share
Transferability, and Firm Performance: Evidence from ANCSA Corporations, 24
J. FIN. ECON. 69, 99 (1989) (arguing that, due to transferability restrictions,
shareholders wage political-style campaigns to gain support of other shareholders
and to influence management); see also Jonathan M. Karpoff & Edward M. Rice,
The Structure and Performance of Alaska Native Corporations, 10 CONTEMP.
POL’Y ISSUES 71, 83 (1992) (explaining that management of Settlement Trusts
“would likely become politicized, much like many current aspects of the
corporations”).
69. E. Budd Simpson, Doing Business with Alaska Native Corporations,
BUSINESS LAW TODAY, July/Aug. 2007, at 37–38.
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Another corporation provided commercial transportation
from a remote village to a remote logging site where village
70
corporation shareholders acted as stevedores. In that case, the
plaintiff argued that the village corporation was subsidizing the
lodging of the workers while on-site and likely received little if any
financial benefit from these maneuvers. The trial court, though,
found in favor of the village corporation, and the Alaska Supreme
Court, under an abuse of discretion standard, affirmed this
71
decision. Nevertheless, it is not clear that actions of the village
corporation resulted in any real economic benefit. Political
exigencies may have helped motivate the actions.
B. Consequences of Differing Functions
In serving a variety of non-corporate functions, Native
corporations often take action that can be construed as contrary to
accepted corporate governance standards. With such a variety of
interests that are often conflicting, directors and managers can
become overextended and have a difficult time making business
decisions.
1. Discriminatory Distributions (Dividends and Other
Payments). By serving multiple non-corporate functions that favor
some shareholders over others, Native corporations often sacrifice
the widely accepted corporate law rule that the operations of the
corporation are to be run to the benefit of all shareholders. One
such illustration of this phenomenon is discriminatory
distributions—that is, dividends and other payments made to some
shareholders, but not others.
An example of discriminatory distributions dates back to the
72
Kake Tribal Corporation, a large village corporation,
1980s.
began a program to purchase whole life insurance policies on
shareholders’ lives. The corporation, however, established
eligibility criteria. A shareholder had to apply for the benefit,
70. See Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc., 24 P.3d 1208, 1210–12 (Alaska 2002)
(upholding trial court finding that, rather than a distribution subject to the equal
treatment rule, the corporate subsidy of living and transportation expenses was
part of a fully disclosed program of shareholder hire).
71. But see id. at 1210, 1212 (affirming lower court finding that lodging was not
subsidized and that potential economic benefit existed).
72. The facts are outlined in Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320
(Alaska 1997). The author served as co-counsel to plaintiffs and argued the case
before the Alaska Supreme Court. Due to the author’s personal involvement in
the case, the facts provided herein are more illustrative than the factual account in
the court’s opinion.
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which she would not know of unless she had remained in the
village or had received a communication from a friend who had.
Publicity about the program was word-of-mouth. Further, the
applicant had to be over twenty-one years of age. Lastly, she also
had to be an original shareholder, with ownership dating to the
corporation’s formation in 1977. Because of these limitations, only
48% of the corporation’s approximately 560 shareholders received
the insurance benefit.
Traditional corporate law holds that distributions must be
uniform across a class of shares. A corollary holds that the
corporation makes distributions with respect to shares, not with
respect to shareholders. The identity of the shareholder (under
eighteen, over eighteen, over sixty-five, lives in the village, lives
73
outside the village, and so on) is irrelevant.
Arlene Hanson, the widow of an original shareholder, sensed
this and made inquiries into the shareholder insurance benefits.
The corporation refused to supply her with an application. She
consulted an attorney, who, after being rebuffed by the corporation
as well, brought a class action lawsuit. The Supreme Court of
Alaska upheld a judgment for the plaintiffs and expanded an award
of damages from $47.30 to $98 per share for adults and $121 per
74
share for youths. The court held that the youths’ minority had
tolled the statue of limitations. Eventually, the parties agreed to a
$7 million settlement.
Hanson illustrates a court decision limiting a Native
corporation’s power to distribute benefits to less than all
shareholders. However, Native corporations continue to make
payments to or on behalf of certain, but less than all,
75
shareholders. Certain portions of the ANCSA seem to authorize
76
such distributions. Other sections of the ANCSA may seem to,
but are limited in scope. For example, one section of the ANCSA
establishes the “[a]uthority of a Native Corporation to provide
benefits to its shareholders . . . to promote [their] health, education,
or welfare. . . . Eligibility for such benefits need not be based on
73. See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 58, § 5352.
74. See Hanson, 939 P.2d at 1329–30. The court gave all shares an amount
equal to that received by elder shareholders, who had been ineligible for insurance
and received cash instead. The six-year statute of limitations, however, cut off at
$98 per share for adult Alaska Natives. There was no similar cutoff for youths, for
whom the statute of limitations had been tolled by their minority. They received a
full measure of parity with the elder group, namely $121 per share.
75. See Bluemink, supra note 56, at B-1; see also supra Part IV.A.2 (provision
of elder benefits).
76. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (2000).
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share ownership . . . and such benefits may be provided on a basis
other than . . . share ownership.”77 This provision protects
distributions to some shares, much as a not-for-profit corporation’s
actions would be protected in dispensation of its largess. Yet, in all
probability due to a drafting mistake, the provision only applies to
78
regional corporations, not Native village corporations.
2. Tendency Toward Management Myopia. One principal
reason for the push for independent directors is the hope that, with
independence, boards of directors will become more diverse, not
merely in terms of skin color or sex, but of viewpoints and base of
experience. By contrast, ANCSA provides that in Native village
79
corporations all directors must be Natives. At first blush, the
requirement seems innocuous, a product of the time when
Congress enacted ANCSA. But experience shows that Alaska
Native Corporations often lack the range of viewpoints,
perspectives, and independence that characterize boards of
comparably sized public companies.
3. Suggested Use of Advisory Boards. Advisory boards of
directors have become common in the high-tech, banking, and real
estate fields. For example, a corporation might create an advisory
board staffed by persons whose technical expertise is unparalleled,
but who remain completely unschooled in business or finance.
Advisory board members receive the same salary and emoluments
of office as do those individuals whom shareholders elect as
directors. Banks often have staff advisory boards for various
regions as sources of information about trends and business
practices in disparate areas in which the bank does business. A
corrective measure to the management myopia in certain ANCSA
corporations might be to institute a small, diverse advisory board
that could supply a wider range of viewpoints and a critical eye that
is arguably now absent.

77. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(r) (2000).
78. ANCSA section 7 governs regional, not village, corporations. Moreover,
section 8(c) explicitly states which provisions applicable to regional corporations
carry over to apply to village corporations and does not include subsection (r).
See 43 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (2000). If its drafters intended subsection (r) to permit
village corporations to deviate from the usual rules applicable to corporations,
evidently those drafters placed the provision in the wrong place.
79. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(f) (2000) (mandating that all directors must be shareholders
who must, in turn, be Natives).
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V. THE REMAINING STRICTURES OF TRUST LAW
Trust law has traditionally been more restrictive than
corporate law. This remains true in many areas, such as with the
duty of loyalty. However, in other ways trust and corporate law
are no longer as far apart.
A. The Theories
Some differences between corporate, trust, and other laws are
theoretical today. A trust, for example, is a relationship between
trustees and beneficiaries, not a separate enterprise.
A
80
At least in the
corporation, in contrast, is a separate being.
81
abstract, a corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible,”
separate from its owners, flesh and blood or otherwise, for all
purposes. In between, a partnership is schizophrenic. The original
Uniform Partnership Act treats a partnership as an aggregate of
individuals for some purposes and as an entity in its own right for
82
Today’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”)
others.
remains schizophrenic, leaning more toward an entity theory than
83
an aggregate theory.
B. Duty of Loyalty: Differing Interested Director and Trustee
Standards
As compared to corporate law, trustee law is stricter with
respect to duty of loyalty transactions. Trustees, it is well accepted,
may not purchase at their own sale. The absolute prohibition
84
applies regardless of whether the transaction was fair. Thus, the
range of choices is much narrower when the fiduciary is a trustee
rather than a corporate director and deals with the trust or with
trust property. When the warning flag (that is, a conflict of
interest) pops up, a trustee, advisor, or both must conclude that the

80. See, e.g., KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 211.
81. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
82. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 276, Chairman’s prefatory note (1914)
(describing the dichotomy of the “entity theory” and the “aggregate or common
law theory,” and adopting the aggregate of individuals associated in business
theory with “modification”).
83. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 6, prefatory note (2003) (“The
Revised Act enhances the entity treatment of partnerships to achieve simplicity
for state law purposes, particularly in matters concerning the title to partnership
property. RUPA does not, however, relentlessly apply the entity approach. The
aggregate approach is retained for some purposes, such as partners’ joint and
several liability.”).
84. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95, at 343 (6th ed. 1987).
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transaction cannot go forward.
A trustee cannot self-deal
(“purchase at her own sale”). The prohibition is absolute.85
C. Standards of Care May Differ Between Corporation and Trust
Traditionally, the trustee had to meet a high, objective
standard of care; namely, the care and skill with which a reasonably
prudent person would exercise the management of her own
86
By contrast, corporate officials have a lower, quasiaffairs.
subjective standard. They need only “discharge their duties with
the care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe
87
appropriate in similar circumstances.” However, some authorities
deny that any difference exists any longer. “Under both the trust
and corporate legal regimes, the fiduciary must exercise such
attention to the affairs of the organization (what to do and how to
do it) as would a prudent person in managing his or her own
88
affairs.” The objective standard of tort law, the care taken by a
reasonably prudent person in the circumstances, falls in between
89
these two extremes.
D. Penalties for Fiduciary Duty Violations
Whether under trust, corporate law, partnership, or other
doctrines, the remedies a plaintiff may seek from a feckless
fiduciary are extreme. The plaintiff may seek money damages
equivalent to the harm the entity has suffered; the illicit profits the
fiduciary has gained, even though the entity has suffered no
positive harm; all gains whether achieved by virtue of the breach or
through the fiduciary’s independent efforts, often by way of
imposition of a constructive trust; and disgorgement of all
compensation received by the defendant during the period a court
90
Arguably, a
finds him to have been in breach of his duties.
85. See, e.g., Susan Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 598 (1999) (“A trustee
who deals directly with the trust will have breached his or her duty of loyalty
regardless of whether the trustee acted in good faith and regardless of the fairness
of the transaction.”).
86. See IIA AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 174, at 466–67 (4th ed. 1987).
87. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2005).
88. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 25, at
17.
89. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 15, §§ 6.02–.03, at 251–57 (comparing and
contrasting director, trustee and reasonable person standards of care).
90. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 15, § 10.11, at 575–80 (constructive trusts
and forfeiture of compensation); 3 FLETCHER, supra note 58, § 884.90, at 362–64
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plaintiff may seek more from a trustee; a court may “surcharge” a
trustee who has breached his duty.91
Today, the practice of surcharging a trustee has given way to
Internal Revenue Code section 4958. Section 4958 permits the
Internal Revenue Service to levy an excise tax of twenty-five
percent on a fiduciary (trustee or not-for-profit director or
executive) of a charity who receives “excess benefits,” and 200% if
92
the situation remains uncorrected.
E. Restrictions on Delegations
Restrictions on delegations are illustrative of the manner in
which trust and corporate law may differ but also of the way in
which they are coming closer together. Traditionally, a trustee
93
could only delegate ministerial trust functions. Like the prudent
person standard, the prohibition on delegations limited the ability
of trustees and trusts to avail themselves of modern portfolio
94
management methods. The 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act
adopted a prudent investor standard in lieu of a prudent person
95
standard, expressly to permit a trustee to use professional money
96
managers in the same way a wealthy individual would. The newer
97
versions of the Restatement of Trusts reflect the development.
Corporations’ boards of directors have always delegated, at
least in all but the smallest of corporations. They entrusted to the
(constructive trusts); id. § 888, at 370–72 (liability for profits regardless of good
faith or want of damage to the corporation); id. § 894, at 384–86 (forfeiture of
compensation in the discretion of the court).
91. See, e.g., 3 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 86, § 206, at 252–54; Richard V.
Wellman, Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries–Is Rothko Right?, 77
MICH. L. REV. 95, 96 (1978) (criticizing courts that surcharge “a disloyal fiduciary
for a sum exceeding amounts causally related to the breach”).
92. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2000); see generally Gary, supra note 85, at 632–33
(discussing the background and intent of § 4958).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959). See John H. Langbein,
Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law, 59 MO. L. REV. 105
(1994) (discussing the move from the nondelegation rule to a more pro-delegation
rule).
94. See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE
PRUDENT MAN RULE 152–57 (1986).
95. UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(b) (1994), 7B U.L.A. 15–48 (2003).
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act was adopted by Alaska in 1998 and is
currently still in force; ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.225–.290 (2006).
96. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (1994), 7B U.L.A. 15–48 (2003).
97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2003). See generally Gary, supra
note 85, at 600–03 (describing the history of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act
and reasons for its adoption into the Restatement).
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corporation’s officers the day-to-day and month-to-month
management of the corporation’s business and affairs. They
delegated board functions to groups of their own number, that is,
director committees. Over time, the list of matters that could not
98
be delegated has become smaller. Seemingly, under the most
recent versions of the Model Business Corporation Act, a board
99
committee could count a non-director as a member.
VI. GOVERNANCE IN A TRUST OPERATED AS A PARTNERSHIP
Governance in a corporation and a trust may still be different
in some key respects, but at least one point is clear. Akin to
corporations, trusts may control significant assets and business
operations and the governance tools needed are by and large
common to both forms of legal entity. The seminal example is
Hawaii’s Bishop Estate.
A. Background
Hawaii’s Bishop Estate became fantastically wealthy. In the
1950s, the trust already was “by far the biggest private landholder
100
in the state. Its name was on one of every nine acres . . . .”
Successive land booms in Hawaii “push[ed] land values higher and
101
higher, in some cases by 1,000 percent, then 2,000 percent . . . .”
Cash flow began to match rises in asset values.
Successive surges in revenue coincided with the malefactions
of the Bishop Estate trustees. The trustees mis-invested the money
102
that came into their hands. They mismanaged not only the trust
but also the Kamehameha School, the trust’s principal beneficiary.
The trustees began shading over from micromanaging to officious
intermeddling in the beneficiary’s affairs. Mis-investment aside,
the trustees oversaw subordinates’ waste of trust assets on
98. Compare BRANSON, supra note 15, § 4.30, at 204–07 (describing how 1984
Model Business Corporation Act listed eight matters that a full board could not
delegate to a committee), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25(e) (2005) (listing
only four matters that may not be delegated under current Model Act).
99. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.25(a) (2005) (“[A] board of directors may
create one or more committees and appoint one or more members of the board of
directors to serve on any such committee.”). This phrasing seemingly permits
non-directors to be members of board committees.
100. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 53. At its high point, Bishop Estate held
fee simple title to 440,184 acres. Id. at 32.
101. Id. at 53.
102. Id. at 195–97. A single investment in 1991-93 of $500 million in Goldman
Sachs turned out to be a “home run.” Bishop Estate realized $1.5 billion upon
Goldman’s initial public offering in 1999. Id. at 197–99, 255.
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expenditures that served no business purpose. Lastly, a principal
item of waste was the remuneration the trustees had the trust pay
them, exceeding $1 million per year for what were part-time
103
positions.
Similar to some ANCSA corporations, the Bishop Estate, a
trust, shifted from operation as a charity to a partnership to a
political entity.
B. Hoarding Assets
Over ten years, the Bishop Estate trustees saw to it that the
trust accumulated $350 million in liquid assets, “five times a single
104
year’s operating budget” for the Kamehameha Schools. At the
same time, Kamehameha rejected eleven out of every twelve
105
applicants. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service assessed the
trust large amounts of taxes on “unrelated business income”
because the Bishop Estate trustees placed excess cash in operating
106
entities using business corporations as their legal form.
C. Mis-investments
In the late 1980s, the financial consultants to the trust
proposed “a well-diversified portfolio of marketable securities . . .
professionally managed and [which] took full advantage of Bishop
107
Estate’s tax exempt status”:
The trustees, however, took a different route. With the proceeds
from land sales during the 1980s and 1990s the trustees set up tax
paying companies, wholly owned by the Bishop Estate, that
actively pursued “special-situation investments” [oil drilling, a
golf course, commercial real estate]. These were private
business deals that offered the potential of large gains
somewhere down the road with the likelihood of little or no
income in the meantime.
They tended to be risky, illiquid, and
108
not easily managed . . . .

Effectively operating the trust as a private equity firm, the trustees
bet that by investing in operating businesses, they could reap larger
profits, even after paying ordinary income taxes on “unrelated

103. See id. at 54–55, 100, 190–91, 201–02. For a significant period of time,
“[e]ach trustee was taking nearly $1 million in annual trustee fees and enjoying the
perks of a Bishop Estate trustee, such as the offer of free membership at exclusive
golf courses . . . .” Id. at 76.
104. Id. at 200
105. Id. at 201.
106. Id. at 197.
107. Id. at 81–82.
108. Id. at 82–83.
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business income,” than they could with a portfolio of passive
investments and no income taxes. Overall, they lost that bet.109 In
one window alone, 1994 to 1996, Arthur Andersen found that the
110
Bishop Estate lost $2 million or more in forty-seven investments.
D. Micro-management
To justify trustee compensation that exceeded $1 million per
trustee per year, the trustees clung to the “‘lead trustee’ system.”
“[T]rust functions and areas of responsibility were divvied up
among the Bishop Estate trustees.” Each trustee was responsible
for one of five areas:
asset management, education and
communication, government affairs, legal affairs, and alumni
111
relations. One trustee had a staff of thirteen employees.
Experienced persons urged the trustees to accept one of two
alternatives. The first option was to leave the management of the
schools to the principal and his staff. The second option was to
hire a CEO and to adopt a corporate-style model, with the five
trustees acting as a board of directors that would oversee
management by senior executives rather than attempting to
manage the charity themselves. The trustees turned deaf ears to all
112
proposals.
E. Officious Intermeddling
Corporate directors do not necessarily violate their duty of
care by micromanaging. Damage to the corporation is an element
of the cause of action. Until damages result, duty-of-care
113
violations are in the air, so to speak, and are not actionable. The
trustees of the Bishop Estate, however, did harm the trust.
One trustee set up an office for herself at Kamehameha
School. She forced the school to abandon the five-year contracts it
109. See id. at 195–98.
110. Id. at 195. The duty of care has also been the means by which
shareholders have attacked purposeful acts that, while not venal, make little sense.
See, e.g., Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 76–78 (N.Y. 1880) (directors exhausted
remaining funds on new building). Not only did the Bishop trustees cause the
trust to make bad investments, thus violating their duty of care in investing on the
trust’s behalf, but the trustees also violated their duty of loyalty. For example,
trustees made personal multi-million dollar investments in a Texas coal bed
methane natural gas project, MacKenzie Methane. The trustees then caused the
trust to invest a further $85 million to prop up a failing venture in which they had
personal investments. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 83.
111. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 97.
112. See id. at 86–87, 123–24, 164.
113. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 15, § 6.14.
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had traditionally awarded, substituting year-to-year appointments
that put everyone on the bubble each year. In a noisy withdrawal,
114
one valued teacher quit as a result of trustee intermeddling.
Others preceded and followed him, for similar reasons.
In the mid-1990s, when the trustees changed the direction of
the school’s outreach from an extension program to new schools,
the schools had to hire new staff members. Not only did a trustee
insist upon review of all prospective hires, she allowed paperwork
to sit on her desk for months. The schools were able to begin
hiring only seven weeks before they opened their doors, and were
115
thus at a distinct disadvantage.
F. Waste of Assets
Courts have defined “waste” as a transaction in which “‘no
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that
116
The
the corporation has received adequate consideration.’”
business judgment rule, which protects both directors and
transactions from judicial scrutiny, does not extend its protections
to acts or transactions found to have involved waste or gifting of
117
corporate assets.
Waste by the Bishop Estate trustees included sixteen trips to
Las Vegas by a trustee, who never once accounted for the trust
118
funds she spent. Additionally, the trustees caused the trust to pay
the defense costs of an employee who had been charged with a
119
crime unrelated to his duties at the trust.
114. See KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 109–10, 118–24.
115. Id. at 118–19.
116. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998)); see also
Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979); Schreiber v. Carney, 447
A.2d 7, 26–27 (Del. Ch. 1982). See generally BRANSON, supra note 15, § 6.15.
117. See, e.g., 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c), at 184 (1994); Fred W. Triem,
Judicial Schizophrenia in Corporate Law: Confusing the Standard of Care with the
Business Judgment Rule, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 23 (2007).
118. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 110–11.
119. Id. at 203. Additionally, the trust was made to finance campaign expenses
for friends of the trustees who had run for office. Trustees forced Bishop Estate
employees to sell tickets to political fundraisers to benefit friendly politicians. The
employees targeted the sale of tickets to firms that did “non bid” business with
Bishop Estate. In whole or in part, the firms could then recoup the cost of tickets
through overcharging the trust for goods and services. See id. at 203, 208. In
another case, the trustees caused payment of a $132,000 “consulting fee” to the
speaker of the state house of representatives for his “services” in the purchase of
land in upcountry Maui. Id. at 223.

03__BRANSON.DOC

232

12/17/2007 11:31:19 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[24:203

Despite the existence of an in-house legal staff to aid them, the
trustees expended millions of dollars to hire outside lawyers.120
Yet, the trust had neither any policy with regard to employee or
trustee conflicts of interest, nor rudimentary training in what
121
fiduciary duties may require.
G. Trustee Compensation
The tail that wagged the dog was the receipt by each trustee of
122
Trustees justified their
$1 million in annual compensation.
compensation on the time they expended with the charity and
123
hands-on involvement in the choice of investments, neither of
which any trustee should be doing in a trust the size of the Bishop
Estate.
Under English common law, of course, both trustee and
corporate director positions were honorary in nature. The law
expected persons to serve in those capacities with no
124
Compensation could be awarded if the trust
compensation.
instrument provided for it, but, overall, law provided that trustee
125
compensation must be reasonable. And, as late as 1939, the New
York courts held that corporate directors were neither employees

120. See id. at 98, 152, 207–08. For example, Bishop Estate trustees expended
trust funds for lobbyists to lobby against the proposed tax code (section 4958 of
the Internal Revenue Code, enacted 1996) which would authorize the IRS to levy
a twenty-five percent or greater excise tax upon an insider who, like the Bishop
Estate trustees, had received “an excess benefit.” The penalties are known as
“intermediate sanctions,” in comparison to the ultimate sanction, revocation of a
charity’s tax-exempt status. See, e.g., Gary, supra note 85, at 632–34; KING &
ROTH, supra note 7, at 210.
121. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 98. Even the interim trustees, who took
office after the probate court had removed the wrongdoers, hired the most
expensive, and reputedly the best, legal experts (e.g., Professor John Langbein of
Yale Law School and Professor John Luebsdorf of Rutgers) to justify the trustees’
positions and to take sympathetic views of the former trustees’ actions. They
expended $1 million in doing so. Id. at 274–75.
122. See id. at 76.
123. See id. at 100.
124. See, e.g., RALPH D. WARD, 21ST CENTURY CORPORATE BOARD 43 (1997)
(“From the late 1800s until well into the 1900s, outside investors considered their
board service a matter of looking after their assets. Such basic housekeeping was
thought no more deserving of remuneration than balancing one’s own
checkbook.”); IIIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 86, § 242, at 271–72 (“In
England a trustee is not entitled to compensation for his services as trustee . . . .”
Originally, the rule was the same in the United States).
125. See IIIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 86, § 242, at 274–75.
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nor any other sort of agents.126 Thus, they had to look to statutory
and contractual provisions for indemnification and other sorts of
remuneration because the common law would not be construed to
127
provide them.
In the not-for-profit, and particularly in the educational,
sectors, the tradition continues that trustees serve without
128
That is as true at Harvard University, with an
compensation.
129
endowment of $25.5 billion, as it is at an elite secondary school
that resembles the Bishop Trust’s Kamehameha, the Milton
Hershey School in Pennsylvania, with an endowment of $5.4
130
The answer of the Bishop Estate trustees was that by
billion.
131
their involvement they acted as five co-CEOs. They analogized
132
themselves to the five fingers of a single hand, akin to partners in
a partnership.
Neither the trustees nor those who supported them ever
acknowledged the bizarre governance arrangement at Bishop
Estate, with five trustees, legally holding part-time positions, being
paid $1 million per year, who purported to manage, hands-on, a
complex institution with over $10 billion in assets.
H. Judicial Review of Directorial Versus Trustee Compensation
133
As has been seen in the field of trusts, courts insist that the
trustee’s compensation be reasonable.
By contrast, in the
corporate field, courts have abandoned any meaningful role in the
review of directorial or senior executive compensation. In the nottoo-distant past, courts abdicated compensation decisions to boards
of directors, reviewing the board or a board committee’s decision
under the highly deferential business judgment rule, with one
134
Courts applied a loose control known as the
exception.

126. N.Y. Dock Co. v. McCollum, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939)
(corporate directors are not agents; rather they are sui generis in the eyes of the
law).
127. See IIIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 86, § 242, at 272–73.
128. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 100.
129. See id.; see also Governing Harvard, 108 HARV. MAG., May-June, 2006, at
25, available at http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/050688.html.
130. See Shelly Branch, Trust Pushing Sale of Hershey Raises Level of Criticism,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at B6.
131. KING & ROTH, supra note 7, at 100.
132. Id.
133. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
134. See Triem, supra note 117, at 26–27.
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reasonable relationship test.135 The test required that a court strike
down compensation levels if they bore no reasonable relationship
136
to the services or the benefit provided.
It was then up to the Delaware Chancery Court, in the bubble
years of the 1990s, to abandon the reasonable relationship test and
other standards of judicial review, perhaps altogether. In a case
involving an award of one million stock options to the CEO of
Coca Cola as a gift in gratitude for past services, ordinarily
considered a waste of corporate assets, Delaware Vice Chancellor
Jack Jacobs held that, in effect, only the business judgment rule
137
remains as a standard of judicial review. If directors had made a
judgment or decision, were free of conflicts of interest in the
matter, informed themselves to the extent they believed necessary,
138
and had a rational basis for the decision made, courts could not
review a decision, including a decision regarding compensation, for
139
reasonableness.
Thus, although reasonableness remains a yardstick courts can
utilize to review a trustee’s compensation, in corporate law at least,
140
one authoritative court has abandoned the reasonableness test.
In a corporation, the business judgment rule rather than
reasonableness has become the standard. If directors and senior
executives script it correctly, the compensation decision they reach
will not be reviewable by a court in any meaningful sense.
Hawaii’s Bishop Estate trust is a cautionary tale for trusts that
begin to segue through the operating modus operandi of a number
of different entities, without adhering to the principles of sound
governance, which in reality apply to charities, trusts, corporations,
many partnerships and LLCs, and other forms of entity.
VII. CONCLUSION: INDETERMINACY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA
I used to think that choice of entity was a paramount concern,
that continued adherence to a single form of entity was crucial. I

135. The leading reasonable relationship case was Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582,
585, 591 (1933), in which, pursuant to a bylaw containing a bonus formula,
American Tobacco paid its senior managers bonuses equivalent to four to five
times their annual salaries.
136. Id. at 591.
137. See Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 384, 388 (Del. Ch. 1997).
138. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule – The Business
Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 639–44 (2002) (discussing components of
the rule).
139. See id. at 632, 639–44.
140. See id.; see also Zupnick, 698 A.2d at 388.
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argued that, for better or worse, ANCSA corporations should
pursue a business corporation analogy down the line.141
In 1988, I attended a symposium in which the principal
speaker, Thomas Berger, a former justice of the British Columbia
Supreme Court, regaled listeners with tales of fiascos and
management failures in ANCSA corporations in village after
142
He laid all failures squarely at the feet of such
village.
organizations’ formation and operation as corporations,
demonizing them in no uncertain terms.
A Native American legal scholar stood to correct Justice
Berger. A corporation is merely a form of organization. In this
day and age, a Native American tribe functions as if it were
organized as a corporation. The council of elders serves as a board
of directors, and the chief or head person much as a corporate
CEO. The days in which no democracy among members is heeded
are gone. Many of the modes of operation and the consequences
that flow from the choice of legal entity have long since blurred. A
few remain distinct.
Corporate governance, for example, has become governance.
The structure and methods that have come to be accepted as ways
in which business entities should organize are methods of
organization and management. Nothing in them limits their use to
corporations, or to business entities. Thus, “[governance under the
proposed Restatement of Principles of The Law of Nonprofit
Organizations] relies on the traditional corporate model of
governance and accountability: a well-informed, independent
143
board.” “[I]n line with the modern judicial view, [the proposed
Restatement] generally conforms charity fiduciary duties to the
corporate standard. . . . Despite the differences in terminology, the
corporate and trust law standards of conduct do not seem to differ
144
in substance.”
Thus, there exist nuances that may necessitate an awareness of
differences among legal treatments of entities, and perhaps some

141. Branson, supra note 2, at 131–32.
142. Thomas Berger, Speech at the American Association of Law Schools
Annual Meeting (Jan. 1988). Berger has also written on this matter. See THOMAS
BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY: THE REPORT OF THE ALASKA NATIVE REVIEW
COMMISSION (1985). The author of this article reviewed Berger’s book. Douglas
M. Branson, ANCSA and 1991: A Framework for Analysis, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 197
(1987) (book review). In addition, a response to this book review was published
in the same issue. Case, supra note 6 (book review).
143. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 25, at
xxx.
144. Id. at xxxi–xxxii.
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small differences in management methods as well, between trust
and corporation, or political entity, charity, or tribe for that matter.
The differences, though, are becoming smaller. Indeed, focus on
perceived differences in the applicable law may obfuscate the most
valuable lesson.
Setting those differences, whatever they may still be, aside,
corporate governance is governance and little, if at all, about
145
Governance is a bundle of tested
corporations themselves.
structures and methods for organizing and managing the affairs of
larger entities. Having regard for that principle, together with the
lessons learned from the Enron, WorldCom and other debacles,
can point the way to best practices for endowments, charities,
trusts, not-for-profit entities, as well as business organizations,
including ANCSA corporations.

145. Mr. Chief Justice Veasey has stated:
All good corporate governance practices include compliance with
statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary duties. But the law of
corporate fiduciary duties . . . [is] distinct from the aspirational goals of
ideal corporate governance practices. Aspirational ideals of good
corporate governance practices for boards of directors that go beyond
the minimal legal requirements . . . are highly desirable, often tend to
benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce litigation, and can usually help
directors avoid liability. But they are not required by the corporation
law and do not define standards of liability.
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).

